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TERM OF THE COURT

court on the ground that a rational basis for distinction between the two groups could be made. The purpose of an extradition hearing is to identify an individual as the person wanted
by another state. A parolee under section 57.13 has been so
identified in advance by the receiving state consciously accepting the obligation of supervision. Since all parolees are treated
alike and all absconders are treated alike, no equal protection
70
violation exists.

The court also pointed out that Morrissey v. Brewer was
applicable to the section 57.13 situation. A preliminary determination was required at or near the place where the alleged
parole violation took place to establish that probable cause
existed for believing that the conditions of parole had been
violated. 71 In Niederer, the need for this hearing was obviated
by the fact that the parolee had entered a guilty plea to the
offense on which the revocation was based.
JOHN S. JUDE

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

I.

ALIMONY

Societal acceptance of informal living arrangements between unmarried men and women has begun to carry with it
certain legal consequences. Affirming a trial court's finding
that a "de facto" marriage relationship existed between an exwife and another man, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Taake
v. Taake held that the ex-wife's cohabitation with this man
constituted a sufficient change in circumstances to expunge
delinquent alimony payments and terminate the husband's alimony obligation. The supreme court, however, would not bar
future alimony since the wife was not actually married. Other
circumstances could warrant a resumption of alimony in some
degree at a future date.
In 1966 E. Robert Taake and Barbara A. Taake were
granted a divorce. The judgment awarded Mrs. Taake certain
70. Id. at 323, 240 N.W.2d at 633.
71. Id. at 326, 240 N.W.2d at 634-35.

1. 70 Wis. 2d 115, 233 N.W.2d 449 (1975).
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property, including the home, custody of the children, as well
as child support and alimony. This judgment was later
amended to delete the child support provision and grant custody of the children to the husband. Some time thereafter Mrs.
Taake sold the house and moved into an apartment. In 1971
she met Lyle Fink who subsequently lived with Mrs. Taake in
herapartment until he purchased a house into which they both
moved. During the period of this cohabitation Mrs. Taake had
a separate bedroom, paid nominal rent and a portion of the
grocery bill, and took care of the housework.
Wisconsin Statutes section 247.32, allowing revision or alteration of alimony after judgment, does not enumerate criteria
to be used by the court. Rather, it allows the court to "make
any judgment respecting any of the said matters which such
court might have made in the original action. ' ' 2 Mrs. Taake
argued that the general rule that the provision for alimony was
not to be changed except upon a positive showing of change in
circumstances must relate solely to financial circumstances.
Though the court did mention other changed cirumstances
that could be considered, 3 it based its amendment of the alimony provision solely upon the ex-wife's cohabitation with
another man.' Thus, while the court acknowledged that a divorced woman owes no duty of sexual fidelity to her former
husband, it recognized her cohabitation with another man subsequent to the divorce judgment as a sufficient change of circumstances to affect her former husband's responsibility to
2. Wis. STAT. § 247.32 (1973):
Revision of judgment. After a judgment providing for alimony or other
allowance for a spouse and children, or either of them. . . as aforesaid the court
may, from time to time, on the petition of either of the parties and upon notice
to the family court commissioner, revise and alter such judgment respecting the
amount of such alimony or allowance and the payment thereof. . . and may

make any judgment respecting any of the said matters which such court might
have made in the original action . ...
The court cited Weber v. Weber, 153 Wis. 132, 140 N.W.1052 (1913), which cited Wis.
STAT. § 2369 (1898). That statute, however, was in essence the same as the pertinent
section quoted above.
3. The court mentioned that the transfer of custody of the children to the husband
and the wife's sale of the house were material changes that the court considered when
the original alimony award was made. 70 Wis. 2d at 121-22, 233 N.W.2d at 453.
4. 70 Wis. 2d at 122, 233 N.W.2d at 453. The court cited two early Wisconsin cases,
Weber v. Weber, 153 Wis. 132, 150 N.W.1052 (1913) and Haritos v. Haritos, 185 Wis.
459, 202 N.W. 181 (1925), for its proposition that alimony modification may be based
upon subsequent misconduct of the divorced spouse.
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provide alimony for her support. The court did emphasize,
however, that it found Mrs. Taake's cohabitation was not "an
occasional indiscretion but a continuous living arrangement
with arrangements for joint support."'
Justice Heffernan, in a dissenting opinion, would have held
otherwise. On the basis of Wisconsin case law, a husband has
a continuing obligation to support his former wife in the manner to which she was accustomed. 7 Justice Hefferman reasoned
that alimony is necessary where it is for the maintenance of one
party to the divorce and when, without such assistance, the
dependent former spouse would become a public charge.' The
dissenter found that no consideration was given to the underlying purpose of alimony-the necessity for support and maintenance-nor to the rule in Wisconsin which had been followed
without exception in considering the modification of an alimony award, that financial circumstances must be considered
in every case
Admittedly, financial circumstances were not considered in
the majority decision. However, the court would not permit
Mrs. Taake to enjoy both the benefits of her de facto marriage
relationship with another man and the benefit of alimony from
her former husband. To condone such an arrangement might
dissuade her from remarriage.
In contrast to their reasoning in Taake, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Lemm v. Lemm" defined alimony in specifically financial terms, stating:
[T]he purpose of alimony is postdivorce support, and a
change in alimony may be predicated only upon a demonstrated proof of changed needs or changed financial resources
of the parties.
A divorced husband who seeks to have alimony payments
reduced or eliminated has a heavy burden of proof to show
5. 70 Wis. 2d at 121, 233 N.W.2d at 453.
6. Id. at 122, 233 N.W.2d at 453.
7. Radandt v. Radandt, 30 Wis. 2d 108, 140 N.W.2d 293 (1966).
8. 70 Wis. 2d at 122, 233 N.W.2d at 453, citing Weihert v. Weihert, 265 Wis. 438,
61 N.W.2d 890 (1953).
9. "[Slince alimony is for the purpose of providing post-divorce support, the
change in circumstances that must be proved hinges upon the changed needs or
changed financial resources of the parties." 70 Wis. 2d at 123, 233 N.W.2d at 453. See
also Miner v. Miner, 10 Wis. 2d 438, 103 N.W.2d 4 (1960).
10. Though Wisconsin does not recognize common-law marriages, the trial court
found a de facto marriage to exist.
11. 72 Wis. 2d 457, 241 N.W.2d 593 (1976).
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that such alimony payments are no longer necessary to maintain the wife in a status which comports with her standard
of living during the marriage. 2
In 1969 Vivian and Harold Lemm were granted a divorce.
The divorce judgment awarded to Mrs. Lemm child support
and alimony. Following a division of the marital estate Mrs.
Lemm had assets valued approximately at $40,000. Mrs.
Lemm later received an inheritance increasing her estate to
$157,000. Mr. Lemm subsequently brought an action to terminate alimony. The trial court, although recognizing that Mrs.
Lemm appeared to be receiving a windfall because her estate
had increased substantially since the time of the divorce, nevertheless refused to modify the alimony. The Wisonsin Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further consideration.
A material and substantial change of circumstances had
occurred since the granting of the divorce, almost totally as a
result of the inheritance received by Mrs. Lemm from her parents. 3 The supreme court noted that although the trial court
considered the income from the wife's newly enlarged estate,
it failed to consider the corpus of the inheritance. Recognizing
that the trial court's determination should be based on all the
facts and circumstances of the case, 4 the court concluded that
the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to consider the
availability of the corpus of Mrs. Lemm's separate estate, as
well as the income therefrom, to meet her needs. 5
The question whether a trial court may continue to award
''permanent" alimony in divorce judgments was raised in
Czaicki v. Czaicki.11 Prior to 1971, a trial court could "adjudge
to the wife such alimony out of the property or income of the
husband, for her support and maintenance . . . as it deems
just and reasonable" in judgments of divorce or legal separation. 7 Thus alimony was termed "permanent" alimony to dis12. Id. at 459-60, 241 N.W.2d at 594, citing Miner v. Miner, 10 Wis. 2d 938, 103
N.W.2d 4 (1960).
13. Id. at 460, 241 N.W.2d at 595.
14. Markham v. Markham, 65 Wis. 2d 735, 223 N.W.2d 616 (1974).
15. 72 Wis. 2d at 463, 241 N.W.2d at 596. See also Bunde v. Bunde, 270 Wis. 226,
70 N.W.2d 624 (1950). The Lemm court pointed to this decision as an instance in which
the court had stated that where a wife had inherited a substantial estate after divorce,
she may be obligated to use some or all of the principal of her inheritance if she wishes
to maintain a particular standard of living.
16. 73 Wis. 2d 9, 242 N.W.2d 214 (1976).
17. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1969).
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tinguish it from "temporary" alimony which could be awarded
as support during the pendency of action."5 In 1971 the state
legislature amended section 247.26 to read that the trial court
may "adjudge for a limited period of time to either party such
alimony out of the property or income of the other party for
support and maintenance . . . as it deems just and reasonable."' 9 It was the contention of the appellant that the inclusion of the phrase "for a limited period of time" in the amended
version of section 247.26 outlawed "permanent" alimony.20
The Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreted the change as a
legislative "spelling out of the right of the trial court to grant
alimony in a divorce judgment for a briefer time span as well
as for a remarriage-or-death limitation as to its duration."'1
The court referred to the recommendation of the Family Law
Section of the State Bar of Wisconsin to the 1971 legislature
concerning the amendment of section 247.26: "That Sections
247.245 and 247.26, Wis. Stats., be amended with respect to
alimony to provide that the court may award alimony for a
limited period of time in its discretion . . . ." No intent was
found to abrogate the trial court's right to impose "permanent"
alimony unless modified or earlier terminated by the trial
court.
The court further reasoned that since the legislature chose
not to amend another statute that provided for alimony in an
annulment action where the judgment is granted in favor of or
against an innocent spouse who has relied upon the representations made by the alleged spouse as to capacity to contract
marriage, 2 "permanent" alimony was not outlawed. Thus,
absurd and ambiguous results were avoided by the court's har23
monizing of the statutes relating to the granting of alimony.
18. Wis. STAT. § 247.23 (1973).

19. Wis. STAT. § 247.26 (1973) (emphasis added).
20. The term is used by the court to indicate an award of alimony that was to
continue until death or remarriage or change of circumstances.
21. 73 Wis. 2d at 16, 242 N.W.2d at 217.
22. Wis. STAT. § 247.245 (1973):
Annulment; alimony. Whenever a judgment of annulment is granted in
favor of or against an innocent spouse who has relied upon the representations
made by the alleged spouse as to capacity to contract marriage by reason of not
having a prior spouse living, or of having completed the 6-month waiting period
for divorce or who married the alleged spouse in good faith, because of failure
to reveal that permission of the court was required pursuant to s. 245.10, the
court may grant alimony payments to the injured party as it deems just and
equitable.
23. In addition to Wis. STAT. §§ 247.26 and 247.45 (1973), the court also mentioned
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CUSTODY OF CHILDREN

In re Guardianshipof Schmidt2 4 involved a dispute between
two contending parties in a general guardianship proceeding
involving three minor children. The mother of the children was
fatally shot at her residence, and Mr. Schmidt, the children's
father, was subsequently charged with the murder of his wife
and incarcerated. Schmidt had requested that the children be
placed in the care of his sister and brother-in-law, the Barkholtz family. The Brezinskis, the children's maternal grandparents, obtained an appointment as temporary guardians of
the children. At the hearing for permanent guardianship the
trial court was faced with the task of deciding which of two
families, both closely related to the children, would be given
custody. Though an award to either of the contending parties
would have been adequate, the trial court chose the Barkholtzes.
The dispute before the supreme court arose out of the father's recommendation that the children be placed with his
sister and brother-in-law. In affirming the trial court's decision, the supreme court held that the children's father's recommendation should be considered in light of the best interests
of the children.
Wisconsin Statutes section 880.0925 provides that in selecting a guardian "[t]he court shall consider nominations made
by any interested person and, in its discretion, shall appoint a
proper guardian . . . ." The relevant factors to be considered
by the court include a preference for the minor's parents to be
the guardian if "suitable and willing. 2' 6 The father himself
indicated that he was "unsuitable" as a guardian because of his
incarceration. Presumably, then, if the sole surviving parent is
unable to take the guardianship, his nomination must carry
some weight.
Wis. STAT. § 247.29(1) (1973) which directs that alimony payments be made to the
clerk of court where the orders or judgments provide "for temporary or permanent
alimony." If § 247.26 banned "permanent" alimony, then it would be difficult to
reconcile with § 247.29 and the reference to awards of "permanent" alimony which was
left unchanged.
24. 71 Wis. 2d 317, 237 N.W.2d 919 (1976).
25. Wis. STAT. § 880.09 (1973).
26. Wis. STAT. § 880.09(2) (1973): "Parents preferred. If one or both of the parents
of a minor, a developmentally disabled person or a person with other like incapacity
are suitable and willing, the court shall appoint one or both of them as guardian."
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The Brezinskis contested the natural father's nomination
since he was found and admitted to be not suitable as a guardian. The court reasoned, however, that to bar the consideration
of the preference of "unsuitable" parents "would be unreasonable if applied against those parents suffering from physicial
disability or failed fortunes, whose intimacy with the minor
uniquely qualifies them to make a most suitable recommendation despite their own unsuitability."2
In addition to the father's recommendation, the trial court
also based its decision on the "best interests of the child" test.
The application of this standard was not contrary to the guardianship chapter which indicated a preference to certain nominations.28 The court noted that this case involved a guardianship proceeding, not an adoption or divorce custody hearing in
which the emphasis would be on the natural parent-child relationship. The court should not have estranged that relationship, jeopardizing the natural father's interests. Thus, an appointment should be made that would best preserve those familial ties.29 Until his rights as a parent are terminated, the trial
court is duty bound to consider the father's nomination,
reserving the prerogative to do what it finds to be in the best
interests of the children.
Wisconsin Statutes section 247.04510 requires that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent minor children "[i]n
any action

. . .

when the court has reason for special concern

as to the future welfare of the minor children." In de Montiguy
v. de Montiguy3 ' the trial court addressed the question of
whether, in view of allegedly changed circumstances, a transfer
of custody was warranted.
This case involved an order which modified the divorce
27. 71 Wis. 2d at 326, 237 N.W.2d at 923.
28. Id. at 328, 237 N.W.2d at 924. See also Wis.
29. Id. at 331-32, 237 N.W.2d at 926.

STAT.

§ 880.09 (1973).

30. Wis. STAT. § 247.045 (1973):

Guardian ad litem for minor children. In any action for an annulment,
divorce, legal separation, or otherwise affecting marriage, when the court has
reason for special concern as to the future welfare of the minor children, the
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent such children. If a guardian
ad litem is appointed, the court shall direct either or both parties to pay the fee
of the guardian ad litem, the amount of which fee shall be approved by the
court. In the event of indigency on the part of both parties the court, in its
discretion, may direct that the fee of the guardian ad litem be paid by the
county of venue.
31. 70 Wis. 2d 131, 233 N.W.2d 463 (1975).
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judgment of Barbara and Lionel de Montiguy transferring custody of their five minor children from the mother to the father.
During the course of the hearing, the trial judge expressed concern over the possible adverse effects upon the children from
the mother's proposed remarriage. Despite this concern, the
requirement of section 247.045 and the expressed willingness of
plaintiff's attorney that a guardian ad litem be appointed, the
judge failed to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
children's interests prior to the transfer of custody from mother
to father. The Wisconsin Supreme Court vacated the lower
court's judgment finding the custody proceeding not to be a fair
determination of the issues in the best interests of the children:
By definition, a petition for an order to show cause why the
custody of minor children should not be changed raises a
question of "special concern" for the future of the minor children. A trial judge faced with a decision to continue a present
custody or terminate it in favor of an alternate custody unless
the petition for alteration of custody is on its face frivolous,
is required to appoint a guardian ad litem for the children.12
The court did more than merely reaffirm what had been the
position of the court for more than twenty years33 and what had
been codified in 1971 by section 247.045. Its decision leaves
little room for the trial judge to exercise discretion in determining whether a guardian ad litem should be appointed.
Chief Justice Beilfuss in his concurring opinion noted that
many attorneys, family court commissioners and social workers
do recognize that the standard of the "best interests of the
children" is to be followed in custody proceedings. Often the
trial judge has the advice of these individuals. The appointment and opinions of a guardian ad litem in such instances
may have but a cumulative effect on the already adequate
source of opinions from the family court commissioner and
social workers of welfare agencies who impartially and ade34
quately represent the interests of the children.
In the instant case, however, the trial court made no effort
to obtain an independent opinion from a recognized social serv32. Id. at 137-38, 233 N.W.2d at 467.
33. See, e.g., Gochenauer v. Gochenauer, 45 Wis. 2d 8, 172 N.W.2d 6 (1969); Wendland v. Wendland, 29 Wis. 2d 145, 138 N.W.2d 185 (1965); Edwards v. Edwards, 270
Wis. 48, 70 N.W.2d 366 (1955).
34. 70 Wis. 2d at 143, 233 N.W.2d at 470.
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ice agency. The children were not permitted to testify. In the
original divorce proceeding the family court commissioner was
dismissed by the trial judge without it appearing in the record
that he had been given an opportunity to carry out his duties
as set forth in chapter 247.11 This case presented a situation
where adequate safeguards for the protection of the children's
interest were lacking, thus requiring the appointment of a
guardian ad litem.
Under circumstances where the trial court in its discretion
is satisfied that representation of the children and information
concerning their future welfare is adequate, section 247.045
would seem to be satisfied without appointment of a guardian
ad litem. The hard and fast rule laid down by the court requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem where custody of
minors is at issue is overly stringent in the absence of a clear
showing of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge.
DONALD J. WALL

INSURANCE

I.

BAD FAITH-EXCESS LIABILITY

Perhaps the most significant decision rendered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the field of insurance law during the
past term was Alt v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.'
This decision provided additional answers and guidelines to
insurance litigators who are constantly faced with the difficult
problems of excess liability for the bad faith handling of settlement negotiations.
The narrow question addressed by the court in Alt was, in
the words of the court, "whether, in a claim against an insurance company for liability for failure to settle a claim, there
35. It is the court commissioner's duty to represent the public interest in the
maintenance of the marriage relationship and to advise the judge "as to the merits of
the case and the rights and interests of the parties" in cases where reconciliation efforts
fail.

1. 71 Wis. 2d 340, 237 N.W.2d 706 (1976). A major portion of the Litigation Law
section meeting at the 1976 Wisconsin Bar Association Convention was devoted to the
topic of the current status of the bad-faith excess-liability issue in Wisconsin, with
counsel from both sides in the Alt case giving presentations on the question.

